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Introduction:  Recap of 2008 Report and Issues for 2009 Update
In February 2008, the School Choice Demonstration Project (SCDP) issued its first report on the fiscal impact 
of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) on taxpayers in Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin.1   
The report covered the period 1993-2008, and addressed two distinct questions:
What is the net impact of the MPCP on state and local public funds?1. 
How is the fiscal impact distributed among:2. 
a. Milwaukee property taxpayers
b. property taxpayers outside of Milwaukee
c. Wisconsin state taxpayers
d. Milwaukee Public Schools
The methodology of the report centered on close examination of the MPCP funding formula and its interaction 
with the state’s two intertwined funding formulas for district schools, with particular attention to how these 
have evolved over the program’s history.  
The two main findings were:
The net fiscal impact of the MPCP is somewhat sensitive to assumptions, but for most likely scenarios 1. 
the net impact is positive taxpayer savings.  Under one likely scenario, the estimated taxpayer savings 
from the voucher program was $24.6 million in fiscal year 2007 (FY07) and $31.9 million in FY08.
The distribution of the fiscal impact is highly uneven.  Despite likely net benefits for taxpayers as a 2. 
whole, Milwaukee property taxpayers have been adversely affected, due to the specific nature of the 
funding formula adopted for the MPCP.  The estimate for FY07 was a $47.0 million adverse impact 
on Milwaukee property taxpayers.   At the same time, the estimated net benefits for property taxpayers 
outside of Milwaukee and for Wisconsin state taxpayers were $42.3 million and $29.3 million 
respectively.
Equally as important as the numerical findings is the explanation of how these disparate results came to pass.  
The main reason is that during the evolution of the MPCP funding formula over the life of the program, funds 
for state aid ceased flowing to Milwaukee for MPCP voucher students, but about half the voucher expenses 
continued to be deducted from Milwaukee’s aid allotment (instead of the state’s general fund).  These features, 
taken alone, would reduce the per pupil allocation to Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS).  However, Milwaukee is 
1 Robert M. Costrell, “The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 
1993-2008,” http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/Milwaukee_Eval/Report_2.pdf.  For a shorter version, see Robert 
M. Costrell, “Who Gains, Who Loses?” Education Next, Winter 2009, pp. 62-69, http://media.hoover.org/documents/
ednext_20091_62.pdf.
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allowed to offset the voucher deduction from state aid by raising Milwaukee property taxes.  Milwaukee almost 
always exercises this option, in order to maintain per pupil revenues.  As a result of this chain of funding formula 
features, the MPCP program has had an adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers, despite net benefits 
to the state’s other taxpayers.  This is the explanation of the “funding flaw” -- the adverse impact on Milwaukee 
property taxpayers -- that has been much discussed in Milwaukee and Wisconsin for a number of years.
There are two reasons to update the 2008 report.  First, the figures will naturally change with the continuing 
growth of the voucher program, along with changes in per pupil revenue allocations to MPS and MPCP.  So it 
is of interest to see how these developments play out on the net fiscal impact and its allocation among groups of 
taxpayers.  
Second, there have been public estimates of a different measure of the “funding flaw” that have led some to 
wonder if the flaw has ceased to exist.   Since there have also been some policy changes, intended to address the 
funding flaw, the question is whether those changes have “fixed” the problem. 
To summarize the results of this update, we will find that:
The net fiscal benefits of the MPCP have continued to grow, due to rising voucher enrollments, and also 1. 
because of the widening gap between per pupil allocations to MPS and MPCP.  For FY09, we estimate 
the net fiscal benefit of the MPCP to be $37.2 million.
The net fiscal benefits continue to be very unevenly distributed, with an adverse impact on Milwaukee 2. 
property taxpayers.  The “funding flaw” persists, despite a recent legislative effort to address it.  For 
Milwaukee property taxpayers, the adverse impact is estimated at $44.7 million for FY09, while other 
property taxpayers and state taxpayers benefit by $52.0 million and $30.0 million, respectively.
The alternative measure of the funding flaw that has led some to wonder if the flaw has ceased to exist 3. 
is a misleading measure, due to a misunderstanding of how the funding formulas work.  This report 
will try to explain the nature of that misunderstanding.  It will also show that the recent policy change 
intended to address the flaw has only modestly mitigated the problem.
This report and its companion reports are the second in a series of annual reports on the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP) that will be conducted by the School Choice Demonstration Project (SCDP).  An 
initial draft of this report was improved based on comments from the SCDP Research Advisory Board and 
research team.  All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author alone.
This ongoing research project is being funded by a diverse set of philanthropies including the Annie E. Casey, 
Joyce, Kern Family, Lynde and Harry Bradley, Robertson, and Walton Family Foundations.  We thank them 
for their generous support and acknowledge that the actual content of this report is solely the responsibility 
of the author and does not necessarily reflect any official positions of the various funding organizations or the 
University of Arkansas.  
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The Net Fiscal Impact on Public Funds
The net fiscal impact of the MPCP on state and local public funds is the difference between the voucher 
expenditures on MPCP students and the allocation of revenues to the public schools that voucher students 
would otherwise attend.   This can be formally expressed as follows:
Net Impact = (MPS revenue/pupil × reduction in MPS enrollment) - (Voucher × MPCP enrollment).  
This expression can be informatively rewritten as:
Net Impact = (MPS revenue/pupil - voucher) × p × MPCP enrollment   
  - Voucher × (1 - p) × MPCP enrollment,
where p is the percentage of MPCP students who would otherwise have attended MPS.  The first term in 
this expression is the per pupil savings of public funds for each student who attends an MPCP school instead 
of MPS; the second term is the public voucher expenditure for families who would have otherwise paid it 
themselves.  The key variables that determine the net impact are:  (i) the difference between the per pupil 
voucher amount and the per pupil revenue limit for MPS; (ii) MPCP enrollment; and (iii) the percentage of 
voucher students who would otherwise have attended public schools.  We take these each in turn.
Figure 1 presents data from the 
Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction (DPI) on the per 
pupil revenue limit for MPS and 
the maximum MPCP voucher 
amount.  The 2008 report presented 
these figures through FY08, and 
Figure 1 extends these to FY09, as 
indicated by the dotted lines.  The 
revenue limit, set by Wisconsin 
statute, specifies the maximum 
district revenues from state formula 
aid and local property taxes (i.e. 
excluding Federal funds and state 
categorical aid).  Since FY07 (the 
year examined in most detail in 
the 2008 report), the MPS revenue 
limit has grown by $629 per pupil, 
from $8,833 to $9,462.  At the same 
time, the maximum MPCP voucher 
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amount has grown by only $106, from $6,501 to $6,607.  Consequently, the gap between the two has widened 
by $523, from $2,332 to $2,855.  Each voucher student who enrolls in an MPCP school instead of MPS now 
provides a net savings of $2,855 from state and local funds.  The growth in this per pupil savings over the last 
two years increases the net fiscal benefit from the MPCP.
Figure 1: MPS Revenue Limit and MPCP Maximum Voucher, FY91-09
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Figure 1:  
MPS Revenue Limit 
MPCP Maximum Voucher
Figure 2 presents DPI data on MPCP enrollments.  These data are full-time equivalents,2 the units to which 
the per-pupil voucher amount applies.  As can be seen, the program continues its relatively steady growth since 
FY99, with an increase of 1,500 students in FY08 and 1,000 students in FY09, to its current level of about 
19,500 students.3
2   Four-year-old kindergarteners and summer students count as less than one FTE.
3   Final figures are not available until after the school year ends.
The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: 2009 Update
5March 2009
Figure 2:  MPCP Enrollment, FY91-09
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Figure 2:  
The last statistic that is needed to calculate the program’s net fiscal impact is the percentage of MPCP students 
who would otherwise have attended the public schools.  Unlike the other data, this figure cannot be known 
for sure -- it can only be estimated from one source or another.  The 2008 report discussed this issue in some 
detail, and no further information has become available to update this estimate.  Specifically, the best estimate 
available was 90 percent, a figure derived from the choices of lottery winners and losers in other low-income 
voucher programs.  This figure was also consistent with long-term downward trends in Milwaukee private school 
enrollments.  That said, there is uncertainty regarding the estimate, so the calculations for net fiscal impact were 
presented for a range of assumed percentages of MPCP students who would otherwise have attended MPS.  
These percentages ranged from a low of 70 percent (representing the outside limit of what might conceivably be 
consistent with long-term private school enrollment trends) to a high of 100 percent.  
Table 1 presents the net fiscal impact of MPCP on public funds for FY07, FY08, and FY09 under varying 
assumptions regarding the percentage of MPCP students who would have otherwise attended MPS.  As 
indicated above, the figures have grown due to the growth in MPCP enrollments and the widening gap between 
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the voucher and the MPS revenue limit.  In the previous two years, the net fiscal impact was positive for most 
reasonable assumptions regarding the percentage of MPCP students who would otherwise have attended MPS.  
Even under the 70 percent assumption, the net impact was barely negative in FY08.  For FY09, the net impact is 
no longer negative, even under that extreme assumption, so it is safe to say that the net impact is positive under 
all reasonable scenarios.  
Table1:  Net Impact of MPCP on Public Funds, FY07-FY09
(in millions)
% of MPCP 
students that 
would have 
attended MPS
FY07 FY08 FY09
100% $39.6 $48.8 $55.7
90% $24.6 $31.9 $37.2
80% $9.6 $15.0 $18.8
70% ($5.4) ($1.9) $0.3
Figure 3 presents the growth in the net impact of MPCP on state and local public funds, from FY91 to FY09, 
under the 90 percent assumption rooted in the voucher lottery literature.  The red bars were presented in the 
2008 report, and the blue bar shows this figure has now risen from $24.6 million in FY07 and $31.9 in FY08 to 
$37.2 million today.4
4 Wisconsin’s Legislative Fiscal Bureau (LFB) periodically receives legislative requests to determine the potential fiscal impact 
of eliminating the MPCP.  As discussed in the SCDP’s 2008 fiscal report, the LFB estimates imply a greater net fiscal benefit 
from the MPCP than the methodology employed here, primarily due to the LFB’s use of a projection for future per pupil MPS 
revenues, rather than the current year revenue limit (see note 12 of the 2008 SCDP report).  The higher estimates from LFB 
continue to hold for this update.  The most recent LFB estimate, issued on September 10, 2008, includes, at the request of 
Representative Jeff Fitzgerald, an estimate assuming 90 percent of MPCP students would have attended MPS.  This estimate, for 
FY08, implies a $46.6 million net benefit, which exceeds the corresponding $31.9 million estimate reported in Table 1.
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Figure 3:  Net Fiscal Impact of MPCP on State and Local Funds, FY91-09
Figure 3:  Net Fiscal Impact of MPCP on State and Local Funds, FY91-09
(assumption:  90% of voucher students would otherwise have attended MPS)
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Assumption: 90% of voucher students would otherwise have attended MPS
The Distribution of Fiscal Impact Among Groups of Taxpayers
The net fiscal benefit from the MPCP is allocated among Wisconsin’s state and property taxpayers through a set 
of three school funding formulas:  (i) the revenue limit formula; (ii) the equalization aid formula; and (iii) the 
MPCP formula itself.  The salient features of these formulas are these:5
The revenue limit formula allocates to each school district a maximum amount of revenues (from state •	
aid and local levy together) that is equal to a per-pupil revenue limit times enrollment.  This means 
that for every student who attends an MPCP school instead of MPS, the total state and local revenues 
available for MPS decline by the per pupil revenue limit ($9,462 in FY09), but the per-pupil revenues are 
unaffected.
The equalization aid formula, in conjunction with the revenue limit formula, splits each district’s total •	
allowable revenues between state formula aid and allowable local levies.  The overall statewide split 
5 This account is slightly simplified.  For a complete discussion, including mathematical formalization, see the 2008 SCDP report, 
which also includes a detailed analysis of how these formulas evolved over time.  Note also that this analysis omits a number 
of minor complications that always attend funding formulas, such as three-year averaging of enrollments, hold harmless 
provisions, and minor definitional differences between comparable concepts that enter the revenue limit and equalization aid 
formulas.
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depends on the total state aid appropriated, discussed further below.  Within the overall split, the 
formulas set each district’s allowable local levy in a way that equalizes the levy rate across districts with 
equal per pupil revenues.  The key point here is that this means the allowable local levy is independent of 
enrollments.  Consequently, when MPS loses enrollment, the normal (i.e. non-MPCP) operation of these 
formulas would be to reduce state aid by the full amount of the per-pupil revenue limit, while leaving the 
allowable levy unaffected.
The MPCP formula modifies the normal operation of these formulas.  Forty-five percent of the voucher •	
expense is deducted from MPS’ aid allocation.   Milwaukee is allowed (but not required) to recoup this 
deduction from local property taxes, by raising its local levy beyond the limit that would normally be 
calculated.  This is called the “choice levy.”
The main implication of this system for funding the MPCP is that Milwaukee does not share in the overall 
net fiscal benefit from the program.   The reason is that almost half the voucher expenses are deducted from 
Milwaukee’s state aid even though no funds are allocated to Milwaukee for the voucher students, because 
MPCP students are not counted toward Milwaukee’s revenue limit or equalization aid.  As a result, there will 
be an adverse impact either on MPS (through a reduction in per-pupil revenues) or on Milwaukee property 
taxpayers (through the choice levy).  
In general (with an exception discussed below), 
Milwaukee has chosen to shift the adverse impact 
from MPS to the property taxpayers by utilizing 
the authority to offset the MPCP aid deduction 
with the choice levy.  But the underlying basis 
for the “funding flaw” is the deduction of voucher 
expenditures from MPS aid, combined with the 
exclusion of MPCP student counts from the MPS 
revenue limit and equalization aid formulas.  One 
or the other -- the aid deduction or the MPCP 
student count exclusions -- would let the “dollars 
follow the child” and spare Milwaukee the adverse 
impact.  But the combination of the two imposes 
a fiscal burden on Milwaukee, while the program 
benefits the rest of the state.6
6 The reasons behind the combination appear to be historical in nature.   That is, the system retains vestiges of the formula from 
the program’s earliest days, as discussed in the 2008 SCDP report and also in the Conclusion below.
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That is the big picture.  Now to a more detailed accounting of the distribution of the MPCP’s fiscal impact, and 
how this update compares with the previous figures.  
Table 2 presents the full picture for FY09.   Line 1 presents the details for the MPCP impact on Milwaukee’s 
taxpayers.   The first cell represents the choice levy, calculated as 45% × $6,607 × 19,500 = $58.0 million.   This 
entry reflects the fact that in FY09 (as in almost all previous years), Milwaukee fully utilized its tax capacity, so 
the full choice levy was added to property taxes.  The second cell ($3.4 million) is the estimate of a small offset 
discussed below.   The third cell represents a new element, “high poverty aid,” introduced in FY08 with the 
intention of alleviating the adverse impact of MPCP on Milwaukee property taxes.  For FY09, Milwaukee’s 
share of high poverty aid reached $9.9 million, providing a modest offset to the impact of the choice levy.  The 
resulting net adverse impact is estimated at $44.7 million.
Table 2:  Distribution of MPCP’s Fiscal Impact, FY09
 (in millions)
voucher 
expense
share of 
revenue limit 
reduction
high 
poverty 
aid
NET 
IMPACT
Milwaukee property 
taxpayers ($58.0) $3.4 $9.9 ($44.7)
Other property 
taxpayers $52.0 $52.0
State taxpayers ($70.9) $110.7 ($9.9) $30.0
TOTAL ($128.8) $166.1 $0.0 $37.2
Data: 19,500 MPCP students, $6,607 voucher, $9,462 MPS revenue limit. 
Assumptions: 90% of voucher students would otherwise have attended MPS; state share of public 
education held constant at 2/3.
Before turning to the second and third lines of Table 2, consider the second column.  This represents the fiscal 
benefit from the reduction in the revenue limit, as voucher students attend MPCP schools instead of public 
schools.  The reduction in the revenue limit is calculated as $9,462 × 90% × 19,500 = $166.1 million.   This 
releases state and local funds.  The split between the two depends on the legislature’s appropriation decisions.  
Prior to FY04, the split of statewide school revenues between state aid and local levies was set in law at 2/3 
state funding and 1/3 local funding (the split, of course, varied by district, depending on property values).  Since 
FY04, the 2/3 rule-of-thumb has largely persisted as a non-binding guide to policy, and the actual rate has 
ranged from 63.7 - 66.3 percent (65.1 percent for FY08, the most recent year for which the statistic has been 
published).  In this analysis (as in the 2008 SCDP report), we assume the 2/3 split still holds, both for total 
school revenues, as well as the reduction in school revenues due to the MPCP.  This implies that the $166.1 
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million reduction in the revenue 
limit frees up $110.7 million in state 
funds (line 3, column 2) and $55.4 
million in local property taxes (lines 
1-2, column 2).  The $55.4 million in 
property tax relief is allocated by the 
equalization aid and revenue limit 
formulas across districts in general 
proportion to property values.7   
Milwaukee has a small share of 
the state’s total property values, 
so it receives only a small benefit 
from the revenue limit reduction 
(estimated here at $3.4 million).  The 
vast majority of property tax relief 
(estimated here at $52.0 million) 
accrues to property taxpayers outside 
Milwaukee, as shown in line 2.
Finally, line 3 depicts the impact on 
state taxpayers.  The general fund benefits from the revenue limit reduction ($110.7 million), but this is offset by 
the state’s share of voucher expenses (55% × $6,607 × 19,500 = $70.9 million), and also by the high poverty aid 
($9.9 million) used to help defray Milwaukee’s choice levy.  This leaves a net benefit for state taxpayers of $30.0 
million.
To complete this update, consider Figure 4, which places the FY09 allocation at the end of the time series since 
FY94.  In this graphical presentation, the blue segment in the negative territory of the FY09 bar represents the 
adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers, corresponding to the $44.7 million given in Table 2.  The 
maroon and yellow segments, in positive territory, represent the net benefits from MPCP for other property 
taxpayers and state taxpayers.
7 The mechanism through which property taxes are adjusted to complement the state’s aid appropriation in meeting the 
statewide revenue limit is through a specific parameter in the equalization aid formula.  See pp. 21-22 of the 2008 SCDP fiscal 
impact report.
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Figure 4:  Distribution of MPCP’s Fiscal Impact, FY94-09
Distribution of MPCP's Fiscal Impact, FY94-09
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Assumptions: 90% of voucher students would otherwise have attended MPS; state share of public education held 
constant at 2/3.
The 2008 SCDP report presented this diagram for FY94-08, but in this update we revise the allocation for 
FY08.  In FY08, Milwaukee chose, for the first time in recent years, not to fully utilize its tax capacity.  It taxed 
$15.1 million less than the allowable limit.  This means that the choice levy was only partially used, so only part 
of the adverse impact of MPCP was passed on from MPS to the taxpayers.  The green segment at the bottom 
of the FY08 bar represents the adverse impact on MPS, specifically measured as the shortfall from what would 
have been required to maintain the per-pupil revenues at the level specified by the revenue limit formula.8  No 
such segment appears for FY09, since Milwaukee resumed taxing up to the allowable limit.
The other feature of this update that one can see in Figure 4 is the impact of the high poverty aid, introduced in 
FY08.  As discussed above, this aid was primarily intended to alleviate some of Milwaukee’s choice levy, by $7.4 
million in FY08 and $9.9 million in FY09.  As Figure 4 shows, this resulted in a slight decline in the adverse 
fiscal impact on Milwaukee, as compared to FY07.  Thus, although this aid prevented the adverse impact from 
continuing to grow, it only modestly mitigated the “funding flaw.”
8 In FY08, the per-pupil revenues raised were $8,978 instead of the revenue limit of $9,141.  This was still a rise over the previous 
year, but not as much as the state law allowed.
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A Flawed Measure of the Funding Flaw
The Legislative Fiscal Bureau’s periodic reports on the fiscal impact 
of the MPCP have generated broadly similar estimates of the adverse 
impact on Milwaukee as the methods employed in this report (and 
the 2008 SCDP report).  At the same time, however, another measure 
of the “funding flaw” has gained some currency in Wisconsin public 
discourse in recent years.  In June 2007, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett 
presented figures showing that the choice levy per MPCP pupil was 
$971 greater than the non-choice levy per MPS pupil in FY07.  This 
was presented as an easily understandable representation of the funding 
flaw.9  Then last fall Representative Jason Fields requested that the LFB 
calculate updated figures on the per-pupil levy amounts for MPS and 
MPCP.  The LFB report, issued on November 8, found that the MPS 
per-pupil levy exceeded the MPCP per-pupil levy in FY09, reversing 
the relationship of previous years.  Thus, by this measure, the funding 
flaw had ceased to exist.  Rep. Fields attributed this reversal in part to 
the introduction of high poverty aid to mitigate the choice levy. 
As we have seen, however, the high poverty aid has provided only a 
modest offset to the adverse impact of the MPCP on Milwaukee.  The funding flaw persists.10  Since there has 
been some confusion occasioned by the alternative measure of the funding flaw, it may be useful to explain why 
it is misleading.  
The alternative measure of the funding flaw makes two calculations:  (1) the choice levy (net of high poverty 
aid) divided by the number of MPCP students, calculated at $2,467 for FY09; and (2) the non-choice levy 
divided by the number of MPS students, calculated at $2,702 for FY09.  These figures are accurate, but the 
interpretation associated with them, that the funding flaw has disappeared, is not accurate.  That interpretation 
would seem to have two steps:  (1) the MPCP students raise the Milwaukee levy by $2,467 per pupil; but (2) 
these students’ departure from MPS reduce the Milwaukee levy by a greater amount, $2,702 per pupil.  The 
problem is that although the first step is true, the second step is false. 
9 http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/FixingtheSchoolChoic22328.htm .  As the “E-newsletter” also points out, however, this was “just 
part of the problem,” and the exclusion of MPCP students from the equalization aid formula is presented as even more costly to 
Milwaukee.
10 As the previous note indicates, Mayor Barrett’s June 2007 statement anticipated that the flaw could continue even after the per 
pupil levies reverse magnitudes. 
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To see the first part, refer to the first row of Table 2.  As this row shows, 
the MPCP students raise Milwaukee taxes by the $58.0 million choice levy 
(45% of the voucher expenses), offset by the $9.9 million of high poverty 
aid enacted because of the MPCP program.  (We leave aside the minor 
$3.4 million offset, which is tangential to this discussion.)  This net impact 
on Milwaukee taxes does indeed amount to $2,467 per MPCP pupil, as 
claimed.
However, there is no entry in Table 2 for a reduction in the Milwaukee levy 
due to the departure of MPCP students from MPS.  That is because there 
is no such reduction.  As discussed above, the departure of MPCP students 
from MPS does reduce the revenue limit for Milwaukee -- the combined 
state and local funds for MPS -- but not the local levy.  The revenue limit 
and equalization aid formulas work in such a way that the reduction in 
revenues comes entirely from state aid.  That is, the formulas generate 
allowable local levies that depend only on the total property values (and per 
pupil spending), but not on enrollments.11  As a result, the impact of the 
MPCP on Milwaukee property taxes is asymmetric:  the addition of MPCP 
students raises the choice levy, but the reduction in MPS students does not 
reduce the non-choice levy.12
Conclusion
This update of the SCDP 2008 fiscal report finds that the main features of MPCP’s impact still hold:  
The net fiscal impact is positive, and growing, due to growing MPCP enrollments and a widening gap •	
between the per pupil public revenues allocated to the MPS and the MPCP.
The distribution of benefits continues to be uneven, as Milwaukee property taxpayers remain adversely •	
affected, despite a modest effort by the Legislature to address this.
11 To be strictly accurate, this ignores minor complications, indicated in note 5, including small definitional differences between 
per pupil revenue limits and the equalization aid formula’s corresponding concept, per pupil shared costs.  For a more formal 
demonstration of these properties, see the 2008 SCDP report, pp. 19-22.
12 To use economic terminology, the distinction is between average and marginal levy per pupil.  The two are the same for the 
choice levy per pupil, but not for the non-choice levy, where the marginal effect is zero.
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Should the Legislature wish to directly address the fundamental cause of the “funding flaw,” there are two 
general paths:
The Legislature 1. could count MPCP students in MPS’ revenue limit and equalization aid calculations, 
and then deduct voucher expenditures from MPS’ aid.  This was the system prior to FY00.   However, 
that system also gave Milwaukee the option of raising property taxes by the amount of the voucher 
deduction, in order to preserve total revenues, even as enrollments declined with students leaving 
for MPCP.   This “choice levy” might have been justifiable in the early days of the program when 
enrollments were small, but would not be justifiable today.   
 
Without the choice levy, such a system would cease to adversely affect Milwaukee property taxpayers.  
One drawback of such a system, however, is that it would actually reward MPS for each student it loses 
to MPCP, since the aid it would receive for each MPCP student (which equals the revenue limit) would 
exceed the voucher deduction.
Alternatively, the Legislature could continue to exclude MPCP students from MPS’ revenue limit and 2. 
aid calculations but cease deducting any voucher expenses from MPS’ aid.  Instead, all the voucher 
expenses would come out of the general fund.  In Table 2, the $58.0 million in Milwaukee voucher 
expense would be moved down to the state row. 
 
In this system, Milwaukee property taxpayers would no longer be adversely affected.  There would 
be no choice levy, since there would be no aid deduction to offset (and the high poverty aid could be 
eliminated).   The state’s general fund would cover all voucher expenses ($128.8 million), an amount that 
is lower than the savings in revenue limits ($166.1 million).  However, the rule for allocating revenue 
limits among state and local sources would have to be modified if Wisconsin is to prevent an adverse 
impact on the state’s general fund.  Wisconsin would have to drop the artificial distinction between 
revenue limits (for districts) and voucher expenses (for MPCP) as separate species of public funding for 
education, with the state/local sharing rule applying only to the former.   The two combined avenues 
for public expenditures on education exhibit a net public savings from the MPCP, and those net gains 
can be split between state and local taxpayers (including Milwaukee) in any proportions chosen by the 
Legislature. 
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